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The rapid growth in population taking place in Florida at the present
time is due in large part to the number of persons brought to the state,
more or less permanently, by the optimism surrounding Florida's latest
boom. Florida has always enjoyed an influx of new residents seeking re-
tirement in the state's famous climate. But of greater significance today is
the fact that a growing percentage of this number are persons in the youn~gcr
age groups. \Vith the introduction of new industry to supplement the long-
established tourist trade, more and more out-of-staters are moving to Florida
to take part in this new boom and to establish themselves in Florida prior
to the usual age of retirement.
'[hose new arrivals who buy homes, move in bag and baggage, and find
regular employment or establish businesses of their own, have few, if ally,
domicile problems. Their physical presence in the state concurrent with
the present intention to make Florida their permanent home effects a
change in domicile to Florida and proof of this intention is readily estab-
lishcd by their actions and interests in the state. Similarly, the elder meun
and women who come to Florida after retirement upon a pension, Social
Security, or under some investment program that does not require active
management, have little difficulty in establishing a clear and unequivocable
Florida domicile. It is, rather, the winter resident, the man who comes to
Florida in scmi-retirement, who enters into the quagmire of domicile de-
terminations.
The term "winter resident" as used in this article describes a man who
meets most of the following requirements: (1) Ile formerly lived in another
state; (2) lie built his fortune in that state; (3) HIe is now retired or
semi-retired in Florida; (4) Hc lives over six months of the year in Florida;
(5) He retains an interest in a business or investment in his original state
which requires somc supervision on his part; and (6) He makes trips to
that state at least annually to look after his interests there. The winter
resident, as such, is distinguished from the "tourist," who merely visits
Florida on vacation, and from the "winter visitor," who annually winters
in Florida but who does not meet most of these requirements and who
makes no pretentions of surrendering his out-of-state affiliations.
*Attomey-at-aw, Stuart, Florida. B.A. 1950, Denison Univ.; LL.B. 1953, Univ.
of Va. Editor, Virginia Law Review, 1952-1953. First Lieutenant, Office of The
Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, 1953-1956. Member of the Florida
and Virginia Bars and the American Bai Association.
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The domicile problems encountered by the winter resident are varied
and many. Too often he takes no steps to establish a definite, provable
domicile in Florida or to retain a domicile in the state in which lie formerly
resided. Frequently he takes actions in each state requiring domicile in
each. If he is not advised as to the consequences of such inconsistent action,
he may compound the confusion to the point at which each of several
states may lawfully determine domicile inconsistently. He may eventually
find that le is unable to establish domicile in a particular state in order to
obtain privileges from that state and at the same time be unable to establish
domicile elsewhere in order to avoid duties and liabilities asserted by the
same state.
The primary fields in which inability to establish domicile may have
serious consequences arc: (1) Tax problems, including the assertion by a
state of intangible personal property taxes, estate taxes, and license taxes,
and the assertion by the winter resident of homestead and other exemptions;
(2) Problems involving efforts of the winter resident to engage in a busi-
ness or profession in Florida on a part-time basis or as a hobby; (3) Domestic
relations problems, including marriage, divorce, marital rights of spouses,
child custody, etc.; and (4) Problems involved in voting and holding public
office. Most of these problems will be dealt with severally below. There
are, however, many other rights and duties under the law that depend upon
domicile, residence, or citizenship which are too numerous to discuss in
detail. Eligibility to serve as executor or administrator' and liability for
military service to the State are a few among the many. As will be seen,
the establishment of a domicile readily provable is an important matter
too often neglected by new residents.
1. SPieic DomICILE PROBLEMS
A. Tax Problems
1. Intangible Personal Property Tax. The layman is often dismayed to
discover that more than one state asserts the right to tax his intangible
property and is even more disconcerted when informed by an attorney that
this is constitutionally possible. The Supreme Court of the United States
has several times stated that there is no constitutional rule of immuniy from
taxation of intangibles by more than one state.3 In State Tax Comm. v.
Aldrich,4 the Court held that in the case of shares of stock, not only the
state of the owner's domicile, but also any other state which has extended
benefits or protection or which can demonstrate the practical fact of its
1. FLA. STAT. § 732.47 (1955).
2. FLA. STAT. § 250.02 (1955).
3. Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Currey v. INcCanless, 307 U.S.
357 (1939).
4. Utah v. Aldrich, supra note 3.
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power or sovereignty over the shares may constitutionally levy a tax upon
the share interests. In another case the Court pointed out that such action
is not necessarily multiple taxation of the same property, but may be con-
sidered a tax on the separate interests protected by the taxing states. 5 This
approach is not unreasonable when one considers the fact that several states
may furnish the protection of their courts and laws to the owner of prop-
erty, i.e., trust property may be located in one state, the trustee may reside
in another, and the courts of a third state may supervise the administration
of the trust.
The Florida intangible tax statute requires each person who owns or
has the control, management, or custody of intangible personal property
subject to taxation under the laws of Florida, including trustees, executors,
administrators, receivers, and other fiduciaries, to file a return of such
property.6 Although the normal tax date is January 1st, the same statute
provides that every such person who becomes a legal resident of the state
subsequent to January 1st and prior to the following April 1st of any year
is subject to taxation on the date he becomes a legal resident of the state.
Accordingly, a tax problem may arise when a non-resident physically enters
the state after January 1st but does not clearly and unequivocably acquire
a new domicile in Florida or maintain his prior domicile. The hardship of
multiple taxation in this situation, however, is alleviated somewhat by a
provision in the same section permitting the taxpayer to credit any amounts
paid to another state on the same property. This gratuity on the part of
the state does not, however, entirely relieve the situation in which the tax-
payer unsuccessfully claim, domicile elsewhere and the Florida tax imposed
upon the property exceeds that imposed by the state of his claimed domicile.
A minor problem in connection with the filing of such a return arises
in determining the county in which the intangible property is properly
assessed. The statute provides that it shall be assessed in the county "where
the taxpayer resides or has his usual place of abode."7 If a foreign domicile
is unsuccessfully asserted by the taxpayer, a dispute may then arise as to
the appropriate county for assessment.
The taxation of intangible interests in trusts is governed by a statute
which distinguishes between resident and nonresident beneficiaries and
trustees.8  The tax is applicable to the beneficial interest of a resident of
Florida in trust estates of all kinds when the trustee resides out of Florida,
or, if the trustee is a corporation, has its principal place of business outside
the State of Florida. In such cases, however, if the trustee returns the
beneficial interest to the Florida tax collector, the beneficiary need not do
5. Currey v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
6. Fu. STAT. § 199.07 (1955).
7. FLA. STAT. § 199.08 (1955).
8. FLA. STAT. § 199.02(2) (1955).
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so. If the trustee is a resident of Florida and returns the corpus of the.
trust as provided by law, then there is no tax on the beneficial interest.
It should be noted that the Florida cases distinguish between a resident
beneficiary's "naked right" to receive income from a foreign trust and a
right to income coupled with other powers and rights in such a trust. In
the first case the supreme court has held that an attempt to levy an in-
tangible tax on the beneficiary's interest is in effect a tax on income which
is prohibited by Section 11 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution. 9 On
the other hand, if the resident beneficiary has a power of appointment over
the corpus 0 or a present right to alienate his interest,' then the interest
in the trust is taxable to the beneficiary. If the trustee is a Florida resident,
his interest is taxable regardless of the taxability of the beneficiary's interest
or exemptions applicable to the beneficiary. 2  The fact that one of
several trustees is a nonresident has been held not to alter the taxability
of the trustees' interest where the trust property is held and admin-
istered in Florida and the resident trustees had actual control."3  The
United States Supreme Court has held that a state may constitutionally
tax the resident trustee's share of a trust even though the trust was created
and administered in another state, the life beneficiary and the other trustee
reside in another state, and the resident trustee does not actively pcrfornm
his duties in the taxing state,'4  Here again the Court stressed the fact
that the courts of the taxing state are available for acions against the resident
beneficiary.
There is little Florida case law on the provisions taxing executors and
administrators on the estates under their management. However, several
opinions of the Attorney General reveal the extent to which local tax
officials may attempt to assess and collect intangible taxes on such estates.
If the decedent was domiciled in Florida, his estate is subject to the in-
tangible tax until it has been administered and distributed with the ap-
proval of the court of original probate even though it is held by an ancillary
administrator in another state. 5  The fact that the sole heir or devisee re-
moves the property from the state does not alter this result.'6 If the decedent
was and the personal representative is domiciled in the state, it is immaterial
that the property is located outside the state.' 7 If the personal representative
9, Mahan v. Lummus, 160 Fla. 505, 35 So.2d 725 (1948); Owens v. Fosdick,
153 Fla. 17, 13 So.2d 700 (1943).
10. Wood v. Ford, 148 Fla. 66, 3 So.2d 490 (1941).
11. Burrows v. Hagerman, 159 Fla. 826, 33 So.2d 34 (1947), appeal dismissed
for want of substantial federal question, 334 U.S. 817 (1948).
12. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Simpson, 59 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1952)
13. Ibid.
14. Greenough v. City of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947); cf. Op. ATT'v GEN.
Fla,, Jan. 5, 1934.
15. Op. ATT'Y GENS. Fla., Sept. 6, 1949; Op. ATr'Y GElN. fla., Nov. 22, 1946.
16. Op. ATT'Y GEN. Fla., Dec. 29, 1947.
17. Op. ATT'Y GENS. Fla., Nov. 22, 1946. - ..
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is appointed by a Florida court, his intangible interest is taxable regardless of
where he resides or takes the property.t" However, if the personal representa-
tive derives his sole authority from another state and the property is not
located in Florida, the mere domicile of the personal representative in
Florida will not give the property a taxable situs in Florida.19
2. Tangible Personal Property Tax. The imposition of the tangible
personal property tax does not present as many domicile problems as the
intangible tax since the situs of tangible property generally controls its
taxable status,20 However, several exemption provisions do require residence
in the state. Section 11 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution exempts
household goods and personal effects to the value of $500 to the head of
the family residing in the state and Section 192.201 of the Florida Statutes
exempts household goods and personal effects to the assessed value of $1000
to every person residing and making his permanent home in the state.
Another statute2' exempts pleasure yachts and boats of nonresident owner-
ship which are enrolled, registered, or licensed at ports other than in the
state, which would be liable to tax in Florida by virtue of remaining in
Florida waters the year around, if the owner has paid a tax on the vessel
in the state of his residence or can show that it is not subject to tax there.
A further exemption based upon residence is not limited by its terms
to tangible personal property, but should be considered in this area. Section
9 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution exempts property to the value
of five hundred dollars "to every widow and to every person who is a bona-
fide resident of the state and has lost a limb or been disabled in war or by
misfortune."
3. Homestead Real Property Exemptions. Section 7 of Article X of
the Florida Constitution establishes the homestead real property tax ex-
emption. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the many problems
involved in establishing and limiting the exemption, but it should be noted
that a residence problem does exist. Among the requirements for the
exemption is a provision that the person claiming the exemption must
reside on the property and in good faith make it his permanent home or
the permanent home of another or others legally or naturally dependent
upon the claimant. (Section 1 of Article X establishes a similar exemption
from forced sale of certain property "owned by the head of a family residing
in this state.")
18. Op. Arr'y GEr. Fla., Jan. 5, 1934. See also Op. ATT'Y CFN. Fla., Oct.
17, 1955.
19. Op. ATT'Y CEN. Fla., Nov. 22, 1946.
20. FLA. STAT. § 200.021 (1955). See Greenough v. City of Newport, 331
U. S. 486 (1947), for Supreme Court discussion of the constitutionality of an attempt
by a state to tax tangible personal property of a resident which is located outside
the state.
21. FLA. STAT. § 200.44 (1955).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The legislature has attempted to define the terms used in the home-
stead tax provisions thusly:
rfThe words "resident," "residence," "pcrmancnt residence,"
"permanent home," and those of like import, shall not be construed
so as to require continuous physical residence on the property, but
mean only that place which the person claiming the exemption may
rightfully and in good faith call his home to the exclusion of all
other places where he may, from time to time, temporarily reside. 22
An attempt by the legislature to engraft a one year residence require-
ment onto the constitutional provisions for the homestead tax exemption
was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sparknan v. State ex tel
Scott.23 In addition, the Court has on several occasions held that con-
tinuous physical residence is not necessary and temporary absence will not
deprive property of homestead character provided an abiding intent to
return is always present. 24 In at least two cases the Court has held that
rental of the property during the winter or tourist season will not prevent
the owner from claiming the tax or forced sale exemptions if there is in
fact no intent to abandon the property as a permanent home.2 5
It is no longer necessary, for the tax ememption, that the claimant be
a citizen,26 and the Attorney General has expressed the opinion that the
claimant need not be a resident of the taxing unit if he in good faith
makes the property the permanent home of another who is legally or natur-
ally dependent upon him and he does not claim any other homestead
exemption in the state.2 7 Further, he need not be a registered voter." If
a wife has just grounds for establishing a home separate from that of her
husband, she may establish a homestead if she meets the other require-
ments 1
4. Estate Tax. Florida estate tax problcms are considerably alleviated
by a constitutional provision prohibiting an estate tax except to the extent
that a credit is permitted under the federal tax law.30 However, the ques-
tion of whether such a tax is due the State of Florida and the amount due
turns upon residency. Section 198.02 of the Florida Statutes imposes a
tax upon the estate of every person who was a resident of Florida at the
time of his death equal to the amount by which the federal tax credit
22. FLA. STAT. § 192.14 (1955).
23. Sparkman v. State ex rtel Scott, 58 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1952).
24. Jacksonville v. Bailey, 30 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1947); Smith v. Voight, 158 Fla.
366, 28 So.2d 426 (1946); 1lillsborough hIv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 837, 13 So.2d
448 (1943); Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Lanier v. Lanier,
95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867 (1928).
25. Jacksonville v. Bailey, supra note 24; Collins v. Collins, sura note 24.
26. Smith v. Voight, 158 Fla. 366, 28 So.2d 426 (1946); Op. ATT'Y G.N. Fla.,
Sept. 12, 1949.
27. Op. ATT'Y GEN. Fla., Aug. 18, 1955.
28. Op. AT'ry GEN. Fla., May 4, 1949.
29. Op. ATT'Y GN. Fla., Feb. 21, 1951; Op. ATT'Y CaN. Fla., Aug 23, 1940.
30. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 11.
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allowable is reduced by the aggregate of all constitutionally valid estate, in-
heritance, legacy, and succession taxes actually paid to another state. Other
statutes impose a tax upon the transfer of property of nonresident decedents
which may be constitutionally taxed by Florida but with a limited reciprocity
exemption," Under these statutes "resident" is defined as a natural per-
son domiciled in the State of Florida' 2 and "nonresident" means a natural
person domiciled without the State of Florida.
33
5. License Taxes. A small but irritating problem is raised by the resi-
dence requirements found in the licensing statutes. For example, Florida
motor vehicle license tags need not be purchased by a nonresident if he
has complied with the law of the state of his residence.34  However, no
such exemption is granted if the nonresident accepts employment, engages
in any trade, profession, or occupation in the state, or enters his children
in the public schools.35 The Attorney General has pointed out, however,
that ordinarily a person cannot be a resident so as to claim homestead
exemption and at the same time be a nonresident so as to operate a car
without a Florida license plate. '
The requirement that the operator of a motor vehicle have a driver's
license issued by the state is relaxed in the case of a "nonresident who is at
least sixteen years of age and who has in his immediate possession a valid
operator's license issued to him in his home state or country."37 Again,
however, the exemption does not apply to a nonresident who accepts em-
ployient within the state or enters his children in the public schools.88
A nonresident is defined simply as "Every person who is not a resident of
this state."31
The aircraft registration fee imposed by Section 330.11 of the Florida
Statutes is made inapplicable to aircraft owned by a nonresident if it is
registered in another state and is not engaged in carrying persons or property
for hire or for commercial purposes in the state.4" However, this exemption
does not apply if the nonresident owner is employed in Florida.
Applicants for fishing and hunting licenses will discover that Chapters
370 and 372 of the Florida Statutes impose varying license fees upon residents
and nonresidents. These chapters carry their own definitions of "resident"
which include the requirements of United States citizenship and continuous
residence in the state and county for varying periods of time.41
31. FL. STAT, § 198.03 (1955).
32. FLA. STAT. § 198.01(6) (1955).
33. Ibid.
34. FLA. STAT. § 320.37 (1955).
35. FLA, STAT. § 320.38 (1955).
36. Op. ATT'Y GEN. Fla., Feb. 15, 1950.
37. F"A. STAT. § 322.04(3) (1955).
38. Fu. STAT. § 322.04(5) (1955).
39. FLA. STAT. § 322.01(9) (1955).
40. FLA. STAT. § 330.12(3) (1955).
41, FLA, STAT. §§ 370.01 and 372.001 (1955).
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13. Engaging in Business or Profession in Florida
The winter resident frequently wishes to continue his business or pro-
fession in Florida either on a part time basis or merely to keep his hand
in his chosen occupation and to help pass the time. Here again he may
find that a determination of his domicile is necessary in order to engage
in many occupations. A few of these will be mentioned to point up the
problems involved.
Section 112.02 of the Florida Stattues imposes a definite residence re-
quirernent for state employment. All employees of the state or of any
county must have been bona fide residents of the state for the two years
next prior to their employment unless no such person can be found who
has the necessary qualifications for the particular job.
Applicants for admission to the practice of law are required to be
citizens only of the United States,42 although the forms for application
which have been used from time to time have included affidavits that the
applicants are or intend to become residents of the state. Persons wishing
to engage in the occupation of funeral director or embalmer must be bona
fide residents of the state.43 And a stevedore must have been a resident of
the state six months previous to the date of his commission.
44
Fire, casualty, and surety insurance agents and solicitors must be
citizens of the United States and bona fide residents of Florida. In the
case of an agent, he must have been a resident for the year last past and must
actually reside in the state six months of the year.45 In the case of a
solicitor, the residence requirement is for more than the six months last
past.46  However, certain limited rcciprocity is granted to nonresidents
licensed in other states.47 Other restricted reciprocity is granted to life
insurance agents48 and to accident and health insurance agents.40
Insurance adjusters licenses require varying residence qualifications.
A public adjuster must have been a bona fide resident for one year im-
mediately preceding the filing of his application for a license.50 An inde-
pendent adjuster must meet the same requirement unless he is an employee
of a currently licensed adjuster or firm.' A company employee adjuster
42. Rules of the Supreme Court of Florida Relating to Admissions to the
Bar, § 19.
43. FLA. STAT. § 470.08 (1955).
44. FLA. STAT, § 307.01 (1955).
45. FLA. STAT. § 627.79 (1955).
46. FLA. STAT. § 627.80 (1955).
47. FLA. STAT. § 627.85 (1955).
48. FLA. STAT. § 634.08 (1955).
49. FLA. STAT. § 644.09 (1955).
50. FLA. STAT. § 636.26 (1955).
51. FLA. STAT. § 636.27 (1955).
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need only be a bona fide resident of the state.52 Nonresident adjusters
licenses may be issued under limited conditions, however.53
In several other occupations, such as optometry54 and beauty culture,"
the only residence distinctions made are in the fees required, and in at
least one occupation, outdoor advertising, 56 a bond is required of non-
residents.
C. Domestic Relations Problems
The tangle of rights and duties arising out of interstate marriages,
divorces, alimony and support awards, and other domestic relations matters
is well known to all lawyers but generally not recognized by the laity. In
this field the determination of domicile becomes especially important as
both personal relationships and property rights may suffer drastically from
an incorrect assumption of domicile.
Florida law requires the complainant to have resided ninety days in
the state before filing a bill for divorce.57 A large portion of the Florida
cases upon the subject of domicile are cases involving divorce. These cases
will be discussed in Part 1I, infra. It is sufficient at this point to state that
the residence required includes domicile as well as presence in Florida for
the ninety days. A venue question may also arise in such cases and is
dependent upon a determination of residence. " Under the general venue
statute, a bill for divorce usually must be brought in the county where
the defendant resides if the defendant is a resident, but may be brought
in any county if he is a nonresident.59
Either a resident or a nonresident may be appointed guardian of the
person of a resident incompetent.60 However, only a resident may be ap-
pointed guardian of the property of a resident incompetent 6' and the
county judge in which property of a nonresident incompetent is located
may, on petition, appoint a resident guardian of the property of a non-
resident incompetent even though the incompetent has a foreign guardian.6 2
D. Voting and Public Office Holding
Section 1 of Article VI of the Florida Constitution gives the franchise
to every person "of the age of twenty-one and upwards that shall, at the
52. FLA. STAT. § 636.28 (1955).
53. FLA. STAT. § 636.31 (1955).
54. FA. STAT. § 463.10 (1955).
55. FLA. STAT. § 477.17(2) (1955).
56. FLA. STAT. § 479.06 (1955).
57. FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1955).
58. Merritt v. Merritt, 55 So.2d 735 (fla. 1951); Evans v. Evans, 141 Fla. 860,
194 So. 215 (1940).
59. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1955).
60. FLA. STAT. § 744.27 (1955).
61. Ibid.
62. FLA. STAT. § 744.18-.27 (1955).
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time of registration, be a citizen of the United States, and that shall have
resided and had his habitation, domicile, home and place of permanent
abodc in Florida for six months .... Section 97.041 of the Florida Statutes
reiterates these requirements as prerequisites to registration.
Residence qualifications for public office arc prcscribcd by the constitu-
tion only in the cases of the governor, senators, and members of the house
of representatives.:1 Section 3 of Article IV provides that "No person shall
be eligible to the office of Governor who is not a qualified elector, and who
has not been ten years a citizen of the United States, and five years a
citizen and resident of the State of Florida, next preceding the time of his
election .... ." Section 4 of Article III requires senators and members of
the house of representatives to be qualified electors of the county or district
from which they are chosen, and Section 8 of the same article provides
that their seats are vacated by permanent change of residence from such
county or district.
Eligibility for aid to dependent children by the state requires residence
for the year prior to application 4 and for mothers' aid by the county the
requirement is residence in the state for the two years and the county for
the one year prior to the application. 5 Aid for the blind, 6 old age assis-
tancee0 7 and admission to or treatment in the Florida State Hospital 8 are
similarly granted only upon meeting definite residence requirements.
11. IETEMMININC DOMICILE
A. General Rules
The basic rules for determining domicile are familiar to all lawyers
and arc neither complicated nor difficult to understand. The problem,
however, is the application of these rules to the facts. Accordingly, this
discussion will deal primarily with the factual situations considered by the
Florida courts and the mixcd conclusions of law and fact reached inl the
reported cases.
In the 1857 case of Smith v, Croornt the Florida Supreme Court set
forth the basic rules in a classic opinion upon the historical aspects of
domicile. This early opinion of the court should be read by every attorney
faced with a problem in this area because of the excellent piece by piece
analysis of each factor cousidcred rclevant by the court in its search for the
proper domicile determination.
63. State ex rel Att'y Gen. v. George, 23 Fla. 585, 3 So. 81 (1887).
64. FLA. STAT. § 409.18 (1955).
65. FLA. STAT. § 414.03(4) (1955).
66. FLA. STA'r, § 409.17 (19 55).
67. FA. CoNs'r. art. 13, § 3; FLA. STAT. § 409.16 (1955).
68. FLA. STAT. § 394.27 (1955),
69. 7 Fla. 81 (1857).
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In Smith v. Croom the court quoted 0 from Judge Story who classed
domicile under three distinct heads: domicile by birth, domicile by choice,
and domicile by operation of law. The first classification refers to the well
established rule that the domicile of the father is tie domicile of all of
his minor children and they are incapable of making a choice of domicile
during their minority'T1 The second classification refers to a domicile volun-
tarily chosen by a person capable under the law of changing his domicile.
This is accomplished by the concurrence of physical presence within a
state with the present intention of permanently residing therein.
2 The
third classification refers to rules such as the wife takes the domicile of
her husband upon marriage and may not normally acquire a domicile
separate and apart from her husband, with certain exceptions which will
be discussed later.
73
A companion principle to these three is the rule that a domicile once
established continues until a new domicile is acquired.7 4 In Smith v. Groom
the Florida Supreme Court considered the result of abandonment in fact
of the domicile of origin with the present intention to acquire a new
domicile when the person concerned dies in itinere before he has con-
summated his intention by an actual residence. The court said that the
domicile of origin ipso facto and co instante reverted and reattached.75
However, it would appear more accurate to consider that the first domicile
had never been lost because the new domicile was never acquired by the
concurrence of the requisite intention with physical presence in the state.
Before proceeding any further with the principles for determining
domicile, it should be recognized that many statutes and cases mix the
terms "domicile" and "residence" indiscriminately and, upon occasion,
include "home," "place of abode," and other related terms.
Perhaps the interpretation of no words used in legal phraseology
has given the courts of this country more labor and difficulty, and
has resulted in a greater variety for judicial opinion, than the inter-
pretation of the words "domicile" and "residence." Undoubtedly,
much of the apparent variety and inconsistency in the decisions is
due to the facts that the words "resident," and "nonresident," as
well as the word "domicile," are cvidenlly used in a different sense
70. Id. at 151.
71. Chishoni v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694 (1929); Beekman v.
Beckman, 53 Fla. 858, 43 So, 923 (1907); Minick v. Minick, III Fla. 469, 149
So. 483, 491 (1933) (dictum).
72. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fa. 1955); Beckman
v. Beekman, supra note 71; McIntyre v. McIntyre, 53 So.2d 824 (H7a. 1951) (dictum);
Chaves v. Chaves, 79 Fla. 602, 84 So. 672, 677 (1920) (dictum).
73. Merritt v. Merritt, 55 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1951); Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla.
469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539 (1926).
74. Wade v. Wade, 93 Ha. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927); Smith v. Croom, 7
Fla. 81 (1857).
75. 7 Fla. 81, 158 (1857).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
in some statutes from that in which they are used in other statutes
relating to different subjects."
The discussion of the various areas in which domicile problems arise,
in Part I, supra, indicates the number of different statutes in which domicile
or residence is involved, and an examination of these statutes reveals the
different relationships to the state required for the different purposes of
the statutes. In the discussion of principles determining domicile, the pur-
pose for which the determination is being made should always be borne
in mind. For example, in the case quoted from above, a wife left her
husband without cause and moved to Nevada. The husband sued for
divorce and utilized the constructive service statute alleging his wife's
residence to be Nevada. The court held that the wife's domicile remained
that of her husband, Florida, but that her residence for the purpose of the
constructive service statute was Nevada. The court said that an allegation
of domicile would not necessarily satisfy this statute, since the purpose of
the statute is to give the defendant the best possible notice and in a case
such as this, notice at her domicile would not be as effective as notice at
her actual residence in Nevada.
As can be expected, the courts have striven to define the terms "domi-
cile," "residence," and the like so as to distinguish their varying usage in
statutes. The Florida court has stated that "residence" indicates place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, but that a "resident" is one "who
lives at a place with no present intention of removing therefrom."' T This
definition of "resident" would appear to be, in fact, a definition of domicile.
The court has recognized this in another case in which it pointed out that
"residence," "residing," and equivalent terms, when used in statutes re-
lating to taxation, suffrage, divorce, limitations of actions, and the like, are
used in the sense of "legal residence" or the place of domicile or permanent
abode as distinguished from temporary residence."8 "Legal residence" of
a person under the divorce statutes has been defined as "the place which
he has made the chief seat of his household affairs or home interests."' 0
The court has pointed out that a man may have several residences at
the same time80 or even several domiciles, commercial, political, or foren-
sic.81 This latter dictum, however, would appear to refer more accurately
to residence than to domicile. Moreover, in the same case the court ex-
76. Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 477, 478, 149 So. 483, 487 (1933).
77. Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Fla. 316, 22 So.2d 817 (1945).
78. Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 539 (1926). See also Evans
v. Evans, 141 Fla. 860, 194 So. 215 (1940); Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149
So. 483 (1933).
79. Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694 (1929). See also Wade v.
Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927).
80. Wade v. Wade, suora note 79.
81. Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81, 150 (1857).
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pressed a particular liking for the word "home" in defining domicile and
distinguishing it from mere residence.
82
In general, domicile is established by a weighing of the evidence as
in any other case.83 Such a question is one of law and fact 84 and of facts
and intentions. 85 The difficulties inherent in establishing intention were
recognized in Smith Y. Groom, supra:
It must readily occur that no compass of language can ever
fully comprehend the variety of actions which shall in any given
case tend to prove the establishment of a domicile; for these acts
will ever be as various as are the occupations of men or the emotions
of the mind. 6
Such intentions must be proven by secondary facts, as the place of a man's
business 7 and where he votes and exercises other indicia of citizenship. 88
The Florida court has accepted the definition of the requisite intent
set forth in Section 20 of the Restatement of Conflicts:
For the acquisition of a domicile of choice the intention to
make a home must be an intention to make a home at the
moment, not to make a home in the future.89
In addition, this intention must be to make a home in fact and not just
an intention to acquire a donicile90 Because the formation of such an
intent is essential, a person of unsound mind does not have the ability to
acquire a domicile of choice and, if he is an adult, his domicile may not
be changed for him by any person, no matter how closely related, who has
not been placed in charge of him by legal proceedings.'
The Florida court has stated several times that the best proof of a
man's domicile is where he says it is.82 However, vague and conflicting oral
declarations are considered unreliable and entitled to little, if any, weightY3
Such items as entries in hotel registers and places mentioned in legal docu-
ments are entitled to some weight but this depends primarily upon the
82, Id. at 153,
83. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955); Wade v.
Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927); Smith v. Groom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857).
84. Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Fla. 316, 22 So.2d 817 (1945); MacQueen v.
MacQueen, 131 Fla. 448, 179 So. 725 (1938).
85. Fowler v. Fowler, supra note 84; Kiplinger v. Kiplinger, 147 Fla. 243, 2
So.2d 870 (1941); Smith v. Groom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857).
86. Smith v. Groom, supra note 85, at 151.
87. Smith v. Groom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857).
88. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1948); Op. A-r'Y GEN. Fla.,
Jan, 5, 1934.
89. Campbell i. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1952).
90. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS § 19 (1934); Campbell v. Campbell, supra note 89.
91. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
92. Frank v. Frank, 75 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464
(Fla.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950); Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So.2d
870 (1948).
93. Smith v. Groom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857).
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circumstances surrounding these events." 4  In divorce cases the general
rule is that the uncorroboratcd testimony of the complainant or admissions
in the pleadings are insufficient to support a decree by themselves, and
this rule applies to ClUcstions of domicile and residence as well as to the
other matters that must be established.,9 However, in one case the court
held that an express admission of residence by the defendant coupled with
a clear showing that the parties actually resided in the state was sufficient
corroboration of the wife's testimony as to residence."
The rcquiremcnt of physical presence is usually one of actual rather
than constructive presence, especially in divorce cases where the statute
prescribes residence for a specified period.17 Ilowevcr, it is not necessary
that during this period the complainant did not leave the state for any pur-
pose, as long as the intention is bona fide."" Absence due to the holding
of political office or for government cmployment does not terminate political
domicile as long as there is a.n intention to.rcturn rather than an intention
to remain away permanently." Under certain circumstances even an absence
extending over a long period of a man's life may not result in abandonment
of domicile. In one case the Florida court found an American domicile even
though the person in question had lived most of his life in Europe."' The
court pointed out that many Anericans spend their lives abroad and men-
tioned the historical precedcnts of Benjamin Franklin and Thonas Jef-
ferson who spent long periods of time in Europe.
The effect of military service upon domicilc has been considered by
the Florida court on several occasions. The court has pointed out that
the nere fact that a man's presence in the state is due to his military status
does not prcvent his acquisition of a domicile within the state if the requisite
intent is also present, but, on the other hand, if there is no such intent to
change domicile, presence in the state due to military orders will not
affect the serviceman's domicile.' 0 ' On one occasion the court rendered an
opinion which could be read to hold that the statutory ninety days presence
in Florida for divorce jurisdiction is not satisfied when the serviceman is
ordered out of the state prior to the completion of this period." However,
in a later opinion the court stated that the basis of the holding in this
case was not entirely the absence of ninety days physical presence in the
94. Ibid.
95. Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694 (1929).
96. Frank v. Frank, 75 So.2d 282 (Ila. 1954).
97. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952); see also 17 A.i. JUR.,
Divorce & Separation § 251.
98. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach. 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955); Wade v.
Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927); Warrcn v. Warren, 73 la. 764, 75 So.
35 (1917).
99. Dennis v. State, 17 Fla. 389 (1879).
100. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Ma. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1948).
101. Gipson v. Gipson, 151 Fla. 587, 10 So.2d 82 (1942).
102. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952).
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state but rather the absence of an intention to establish a present residence
as distinguished from a future one.'"
The court has held that "failure to renounce pre-existing citizenship
is no more than evidence to be considered in connection with the question
of the bona /ides of the plaintiff's residence which is the real test under
our statutory law" pertaining to divorce., "4  In this case the court upheld
the validity of a Cuban divorce obtained while the parties were citizens
of the United States on the grounds that the parties were domiciled in
Cuba at the time.
Probably the most perplexing problems in domicile determination arise
out of the marital relation. \Ve have already seen that the basic rule is
that the wife's domicile is that of her husband and that she may iot norm-
ally acquire a domicile separate from his.'"5 There is a well established
exception, however. The wife may establish a separate domicile if she has
just cause for leaving her husband.' 4 ' She must actually cease to live with
him, though, in order to acquire the separate domicile, and she must comply
with the usual requirements for establishing a domicile of choice.'1
7
B. Summary of Significant Factors
The practical side to the solution of domicile problems is to prevent
their occurrence by "building a case" beforehand. This requires a knowl-
edge of the factors considered significant by the Florida courts in deternuin-
ing a person's domicile. The factors that follow have been gleaned from
a study of all the important Florida cases on the subject. In should be
noted, however, that these are only factors considered by the courts and
not necessarily held determinative by them.
One particular Florida ease deserves consideration at the outset as
an example of this approach to the determination of domicile. In Miller v.
Nelson'" the court had before it the question whether a decedent whose
will was being probated had abandoned his Florida domicile by establishing
a domicile in California. The Supreme Court ultimately based its decision
upon the mental incapacity of the decedent to form the requisite intent
103. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364, 369 (Fla. 1955).
104. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464, 471 (Fla,), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866
(1950).
105. Merritt v. Merritt, 55 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1951); Miniek v, Nlinick, III Fla.
469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Ierron v. Passailaigue. 92 Ila, 818, 110 So. 539 (1926).
106. Merritt v. Merritt, supra note 105; Curley v. Curley, 144 Fla. 728, 198
So. 584 (1940); Gratz v. Gratz, 137 Fla. 709, 188 So. 580 (1939); Edntuudson v.
Edmundson, 133 Fla. 703, 182 So. 824 (1938); NiacQueen v. MacQueen, 131 Fla.
448, 179 So. 725 (1938); Bowmall v. Bowinall. 127 Fla. 747. 174 So. 14 (1937);
Minick v. Minick, supra note 105; Herron v. Passailaigue. suora note 10g.
107. Frank v. Frank. 75 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
108. 160 FIa. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
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to change his domicile. However, the opinion quotes from the opinion of
the circuit judge which set forth twenty-one facts which influenced the
circuit judge to affirm the county judge's determination of a Florida domi-
cile. This listing of the significant factors appears in most disputed domicile
opinions, although usually in narrative form, and the factors mentioned
in such opinions are excellent guides to the factors that influence courts
in their determinations.
The sale of former homes in other states'00 and the purchase of a
hoine,'' 0farm, 1'' or motel used for business and home purposcs' 12 have all
been mentioned by the courts as evidence upon the question of domicile.
The purchase of a residence in England," ' correspondence with real estate
brokers in regard to the purchase of a house,14 and the fact that all of a
person's property is located in the state1 have also been considered. To-
gether with the purchase and sale of property, the courts usually consider
the actual taking-up of residence in the state,"0 especially where the residence
has been for an extended period of time."'
As we have seen in Part II, A, supra, declarations and admissions of
the person whose domicile is under question have been given varying weight
in different decisions of the court. Nevertheless, such evidence must always
be considered a factor as it is mentioned in many of the cases and may be
controlling when it is unequivocable and credible. Declarations may be
oral 8 or written'' 0 and may be found in legal documents,'' in formal
affidavits filed pursuant to statute, 12' or upon stationery. 22 Section 222.17
of the Florida Statutes authorizes the execution and recordation of affi-
davits of domicile in Florida or elsewhere. Although such affidavits are
not conclusive in any case, in the absence of evidence to the contrary they
should normally be accepted as the best evidence of a man's domicile.
109. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955); Miller v.
Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
110. Frank v. Frank, 75 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
111. Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857).
112. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955).
113. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 lia. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1948).
114. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952).
115. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
116. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.Xd 364 (Fla. 1955); Frank v. Frank,
75 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954); Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927).
117. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948) (50 years).
118. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955); Ogden v.
Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1948); Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 75
So. 35 (1917); Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857).
119. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
120. Miller v. Nelson, supra note 119; Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 75 So. 35
(1917); Dennis v. State, 17 Fla. 389 (1879),
121. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952).
122. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
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Other evidences of domicile are found in registering and voting, 123
paying poll tax124 and the filing of income, 125 intangible, 28 and corpora-
tion' 2 ' tax forms listing a Florida residence. 2 8 Obtaining or retaining an
automobile registration or driver's license has also been considered.
29
Where a person keeps his bank accounts and safety deposit boxes is
a factor' 30 along with where he keeps his will' or owns a burial lot. 32
But where a man works, while a factor, is clearly not controlling due to
the variety of reasons for inter-state employment.
33
Other miscellaneous factors are the address given on military rec-
ords, 34 where the children attend school,'"5 where a person was adjudged
incompetent,I'll whcre he belongs to fraternal orders, 1 7 where he is listed
in telephone and other directories,'3 8 where he was married or was separated
by judicial order,'39 the fact that he went to another state because of
his health, 40 the fact that lie returned to the United States from abroad
upon the recommendation of the American ambassador,' 4' the fact that a
wife was "deposited" with her brother under Cuban law concerning domestic
troubles,"42 and the fact that he does not know the name of the county
wherein he claims residence.'"'
I1I. CHOOSING TIIE PREFERABLIE DOMICILE
The winter resident has, to a limited extent, a choice of retaining his
out-of-state domicile or of establishing a Florida domicile. This choice, as
123. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955); Gipson v.
Gipson, 151 Fla. 587, 10 So.2d 82 (Fla. 1942); Smith v. Croom, 7 Ila. 81 (1857).
124. Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 75 So. 35 (1917) (no longer imposed in
Florida ).
125. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955); Frank v.
Frank, 75 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
126. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
127. Ibid.
128. See also Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1948); Dennis v.
State, 17 Fla. 389 (1879), in which the specific taxes involved were not identified
in the opinions.
129. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955).
130. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, supra note 129; Campbell v. Campbell,
57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952); Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
131. Miller v. Nelson, supra note 130.
132. Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 75 So. 35 (1917).
133. Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955); Wade v.
Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927); Warren v. Warren, supra note 132;
Dennis v. State, 17 Fla. 389 (1879).
134. Campbell v. Campbell, 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952).
135. Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Fla. 316, 22 So.2d 817 (1945).
136. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
137. Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 714, 75 So. 35 (1917).
138. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948).
139. MacQueen v. MacQueen, 131 Fla. 448, 179 So. 725 (1938).
140. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1948); Evans v. Evans ,141
Fla. 860, 194 So. 215 (1940).
141. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1948).
142. Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 75 So. 35 (1917).
143. Ibid.
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we have seen, is not possible in the case of a minor, in incompetent, or a
married woman unless she lives apart from tier husband with cause. Gen-
erally, however, other persons may freely select or retain a domicile of
choice if they comply with the requircmcnts set by the law.
The question of choosing the preferable domicile, discussed in this
part, and that of establishing the preferred domicile, once chosen, discussed
in Part IV, infra, are interrelated problems. The purpose for which a
domicile is chosen may have specific statutory requirements, such as
residence for a set period of time. Once the choice is made in such cases,
the mininum rcquirements for establishing this domicile follow without
further difficulty. Again, if it is necessary, for other reasons, to do such
things as purchase a homc and accept employment in a state, domicile else-
where might prove difficult to establish. lowcver, in the usual case the
winter resident is free to retain his original domicile or establish a Florida
domicile if he complies with the basic principles outlined above. It is the
selection of the preferable domicile, preferable in the circumstances peculiar
to the person involved, with which we are concerned in this part.
Too often, iii fact almost always, the winter resident fails to seek legal
advice upon this question. Usually he lets the matter slide until he has
altered his situation to such a point that there is either no choice left or
else lie must take drastic action to effect the preferable choice. It would
not seem amiss for an attorney who handles any transaction for a new
resident, usually a real estate purchase, to mention this problem and to
suggest that thought be given to the subject. Such a warning would be a
part of the attorney's duty when lie advises his client on the manner title
to real estate should be taken or during estate planning, and would be ap-
propriate in many other consultations. By pointing out the problems and
the dangers, the attorney would be doing his client a great sen,ice and would
save the client time, trouble, and money in the future.
The choice of domicile may be made in one of two ways: it may be
a logical choice or a choice made regardless of logic. If made logically,
all the reasons for retaining the original domicile or establishing a Florida
domicile are set down and weighed and the choice is made of that domicile
which will be to the most overall advantage. If the choice is made regard-
less of logic, it will be made for some such reason as the client's hopes
for political office in the future, his pride at being a "Buckcyc" or "IHoosier,"
or other such reasons which do not yield to logical argument. In the latter
case, there is little for the lawyer to do, after he has pointed out the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such a choice, other than to set about helping
the client to establish the chosen domicile.
If, however, the client is susceptible to reason on this subject, then a
logical selection should be made. The lawyer should elicit as much informa-
tion as possible about the client's future plans, his predominant interests,
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and the possibility of sudden changes in the client's circumstances. And as
an extra precaution, if the client is a married man, his wife should be
interviewed. It often occurs that the wife has no thought whatever of giving
up her life and interests in her borne state and she may well influence her
husband to alter his plans almost as soon as he has described them to the
attorney.
The choice, of course, is that of the client and not the attorney, but
the attorney should point out all of the advantages and disadvantages of
each choice and should give his advice as to the preferable domicile. There
are no hard and fast rules that can be followed. Each client's situation
is a little different from that of others. In most cases there will be some
desire predominant in his mind, such as minimizing taxes, voting,
assimilating himself into the community or remaining detachcd from it,
and the like. rhe important point is to bring forward every relative factor
and to consider its relative weight. In this area, as in all others of the law,
an informed decision is superior to an uniformed one.
Finally, if no logical choice is readily apparent, one factor should be
reconsidered and normally should be permitted to swing the balance. That
factor is the simple truth that normally it is better to be domiciled in that
community where a man actually lives. If there are no cogent reasons
otherwise, a man should associate himself legally with that community
with which lie is associated in fact. The problems of interstate living are
such today that they should be avoided whenever possiblc. And then, too,
where there are no alleviating circumstances, a person should bear his share
of duty to and support of the community that shelters and protects him.
IV. ESTAIustINe THE PREFERRED DOMICILE
The second practical problem is establishing the preferred domicile
once it has been chosen. The solution to this problem involves "building
a case," that is, having such evidence ready in advance that no one will
raise a question concerning domicile or, if the matter comes to litigation,
so that the trier of fact will have little difficulty in reaching the desired
conclusion.
The process is fairly simple. It consists of establishing as many of the
factors discussed above as possible and in preparing justifications for those
factors that are not established. The simplest and easiest factor should be
attacked first and then the more difficult satisfied as time passes. And most
important of all, action should be decisive. There should be no question
whatever what inferences should be drawn from the actions taken.
Perhaps the first act should be to file a statement regarding domicile
pursuant to Section 222.17 of the Florida Statutes. The attorney who first
advises action regarding domicile determination should draft such an affi-
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davit and record it as soon as a decision is made by the client. At the same
time the attorney should advise the client to take care in his everyday con-
versations with friends and associates to point out that he considers Florida
his new home or that he still considers some other state as home. The
client's family should follow the same practice and such comments should
be consistent. In this manner, the "best evidence" of the client's domicile,
that is, the place where he says it is, will be firmly established.
Next, action should be taken, if domicile in Florida is to be estab-
lished, to open bank accounts and safety deposit boxes, obtain auto and
drivers' licenses, and give permanent change of address notices to all
regular correspondents. Although it is usually not practical to apply for
membership in local organizations and fraternal orders immediately upon
arrival in a new community, inquiries along these lines should be made
and actual application for affiliation should be made as soon as the client
becomes sufficiently known in the community. Church affiliation in prefer-
ence to mere attendance is an excellent method of establishing domicile
and should be considered when appropriate.
The purchase of real estate, acceptance of employment, entering chil-
dren in the public schools, assembling the family in the chosen community,
and the like, are decisions that will probably be determined more by circum-
stances other than establishment of domicile, and factors such as register-
ing to vote require definite periods of residence which preclude their im-
mediate utilization in establishing domicile. Nevertheless, these matters
should be borne in mind and be taken advantage of whenever possible.
If retention of original domicile is desired, of course, care should be
taken not to establish these factors in Florida, but rather, to retain them
in the state of original domicile.
All in all, building a case for domicile is essentially a matter of evidenc-
ing one's intentions by behavior consistent with that of established residents
in the chosen community. Granted that the average resident does not divide
his attentions between two communities, the winter resident should, never-
theless conform himself as closely as possible under the circumstances to
the conduct of the average resident in the chosen community. Judges and
juries will then be better disposed to agree with the client's professed deter-
mination of domicile.
CONCLUSION
We have considered the areas affected by domicile determinations, the
methods of determination, the considerations for choosing a domicile, and
the means of establishing the chosen domicile. But most important of all,
we have seen the necessity for constructive thinking about domicile by
every person who divides his interests between two or more states. Unfor-
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tunately, the laymian rarely recognizes the problems involved or the need for
decisive action, but fortunately, the lawyer usually has an early opportunity
to advise upon this subject. It is with the anticipation that the bar will
take advantage of such opportunities and thereby benefit all involved that
this article is written.
